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A B S T R A C T  A R T I C L E   I N F O 
Over the last years, stakeholders’ pressures over sustainability issues have 
increased dramatically. Organizations have to demonstrate the inclusion of 
social and environmental concerns in their operative and strategic 
decisions processes. For this reason, companies report their sustainability 
performance in non-financial documents, signaling to markets and 
stakeholders the outcomes of their CSR policies. As non-financial 
reporting is a voluntary activity, there is not a common and enforced 
standard of reporting rules: as a result, the level of disclosure varies from 
one report to another. Sound and material reporting, with a higher level of 
disclosure, is a costly activity, requiring large investments in terms of time 
and resources. Therefore, CSR managers have to determine the grade of 
disclosure of non-financial reports by evaluating their costs and benefits. 
The aim of this is paper is to determine whether the market remunerates 
this investment and if it rewards higher levels of disclosure, providing 
both managerial and academic implications. This paper analyzes the 
outcomes on companies’ market value determined by non-financial 
disclosures strategies in GRI referenced reports, juxtaposing a partial 
disclosure stance against a full disclosure stance, through a 2 years 
longitudinal study of the 2012 Fortune Global 500 companies. Results 
show that while the issuance of a GRI referenced report with partial 
disclosure (C and B GRI Application Levels) causes a positive effect on 
market capitalization, a full disclosure stance (A and A+ GRI Application 
Levels) has a negative effect on market value in the period of analysis. 
This output suggests that there is an optimum level of disclosure perceived 
by the market, opening a debate over the quality of disclosure and its 
ability to satisfy stakeholders’ informative needs. 
 Keywords: 
level of disclosure, corporate 
social responsibility, market 
value, GRI, non-financial reports  
*Corresponding author:  
Donato Calace 
calace@lum.it  
 
 
Article history:  
Article Submitted   11-02-2015 
Article Accepted     20-03-2015 
 
**Article previously published in 
EJEM 2015, vol 2, No. 2 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The definitions of business accountability and success have spread during the last years: 
today, firms are called to achieve environmental and social goals, as well as economic ones, 
in a triple bottom line approach (Elkington, 1997). Stakeholders ask companies to voluntary 
include social and environmental elements in their strategic processes and to be 
acknowledged about their non-financial performance. As “the level of CSR activities of the 
firms is made known to public only through the disclosures” (Kavitha & Anita, 2011, p. 45), 
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disclosing non-financial information has become a critical activity. Today more than two-
thirds of the Fortune Global 500 companies issue a non-financial report (LeBlanc, 2012), 
showing a growing trend that is not prompted by contingent and temporary forces (Kolk, 
2003). 
CSR activities and reporting imply going beyond legal requirements and engaging in 
voluntary actions (McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006). It is a managerial task to determine 
the definition and the boundaries of company accountability, defined as the duty to provide an 
account or reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible (Gray, Owen, & 
Adams, 1996), thereby affecting the amount of sustainability disclosures reported to 
stakeholders (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2010). Thus, to which extent should a company exceed 
legal requirements in order to meet stakeholders ‘demands?    
In answering this question, CSR managers should take into account that the issuance of a non-
financial report has its costs: “a firm making social disclosures assumes that recipients’ 
evaluation of the information will benefit the firm and that these benefits outweigh the costs 
of collecting, compiling, and disseminating the information” (Ullman, 1985, p. 542).  
Thus, the first aim of this paper is to determine whether investing in the issuance of a non-
financial report pays in terms of increased market value. The second purpose lies in 
investigating the effect of disclosing additional information: do stakeholders positively value 
greater amounts of disclosure? To test these propositions, I propose a longitudinal analysis of 
the companies listed in the Fortune Global 500 2012 list. The Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) Sustainability Disclosure Database (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013b) provides non-
financial reports and their level of disclosure. 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows: in the next section, a literature review 
concerning disclosure of non-financial information explains how and why such data is able to 
affect firms’ value, offering a theoretical insight as well as quantitative evidences from 
relevant studies. On these theoretical indications, I formulate the hypotheses to be tested. The 
following methodological section sheds light on the sampling strategy, the operationalization 
of level of disclosure, and the econometric model employed. The final part presents the 
results, analyzing and discussing them, showing implications for management and academia.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Corporate Social Responsibility and Disclosure 
Before analyzing in detail the causes and the effects of non-financial information disclosure, it 
is useful to present its primary antecedent and content, that is Corporate Social Responsibility. 
CSR is a very complex and fragmented domain that has gathered a plenty of attention in the 
last years. This is because “an intensive debate has been taking place among academics, 
consultants and corporate executives resulting in many definitions of a more humane, more 
ethical and a more transparent way of doing business” (Van Marrewijk, 2003, p. 95). CSR 
and its sister-concepts, like corporate citizenship (Mirvis & Googins, 2006), sustainable 
entrepreneurship (Schaltegger & Wagner, 2011), triple bottom line (Elkington, 1997), 
corporate sustainability (Dyllick & Hockerts, 2002) describe why and how firms are called to 
respond for the environmental and social consequences of their conduct, providing 
explanations at institutional, organizational and individual level of analysis (Aguinis & 
Glavas, 2012).  
McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright (2006, p.1) define CSR as “situations where the firm goes 
beyond compliance and engages in voluntary actions that appear to further some social good, 
beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law”. The Commission of 
European Communities (CEC, 2001) describes CSR as a concept whereby companies 
integrate social and environmental concerns into their business operations and interact with 
their stakeholders on a voluntary basis. According to Aguinis (2011, p.855), CSR are 
“context-specific organizational actions and policies that take into account stakeholders’ 
expectations and the triple bottom line of performance”. Van Marrewijk (2003, p.102) 
indicates that “CSR refers to company activities – voluntary by definition – demonstrating the 
inclusion of social and environmental concerns in business operations and in interactions with 
stakeholders”.  
Most of research efforts look for a business case for sustainability, analyzing the relationship 
between Corporate Social/Environmental Performance (CSP/CEP) and Corporate Financial 
Performance (CFP) (Wood, 2010). The majority of research suggest that “it does pay to be 
green” in terms of increased efficiency, strengthened brand and market value, and improved 
competitiveness (Hart & Ahuja, 1996; Porter & Van der Linde, 1995; Porter & Kramer, 
2011). However, there are still skeptical views, according to which the only responsibility of a 
company is the use of its resources to engage in activities designed to increase profits, while 
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CSR strategies are only a source of costs and divert resources from other profitable 
investments (Friedman, 1970; Vance, 1975; Brammer, Brooks, & Pavelin, 2006). 
Nevertheless, recent CSP/CEP-CFP studies meta-analyses show that there is a well-
established positive relationship between the two dimensions, despite measurement, 
methodological and theoretical issues surrounding it (Wood, 2010; Dixon-Fowler, Slater, 
Johnson, Ellstrand, & Romi, 2013). In particular, a new standpoint is emerging, according to 
which  “environmental initiatives may not lead to a cost advantage for all firm under all 
conditions” (Dixon-Fowler, et al. 2013). For this reason, researchers are moving from a “does 
it pay to be green?” perspective to a “when does it pay to be green?” one, not analyzing 
anymore whether being “green” or not, rather than how being “green”.  
The spirit of this study moves in this direction, not providing another CEP/CSP-CFP analysis, 
but determining whether and to which extent corporate social disclosure, “the most direct 
expression of the companies’ attitudes and behaviors regarding social responsibility” (Perrini, 
2005, p. 611), creates value for firms and stakeholders. Corporate social disclosure is “the 
process of providing information designed to discharge social accountability” (Sutantoputra, 
2009, p. 36). Firms have many communication channels to disclose such data: the annual 
report, through the so-called “silent social account” (Gray, 1997), special publications, 
documents or reports, and even socially orientated advertising (Kavitha & Anita, 2011). In 
their study of the disclosures of 57 companies listed in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
(DJSI), Michelon & Parbonetti (2012, p. 495) underline that “on average companies disclose 
more sustainability information in social, environmental and sustainability reports than in the 
annual report”, confirming the significance of this medium over the others. Disclosure can be 
broadly categorized into mandatory or voluntary. As suggested before, voluntariness plays an 
important role in CSR. This is because “governments generally provide relatively little 
guidance on the implementation of sustainability at the corporate level” (Searcy, 2012, p. 240) 
and the motivations for self-regulation are well consistent with those for corporate social 
responsibility (Matiland, 1985). Likewise, Mirvis & Googins (2006), describing the five 
stages of Corporate Citizenship, indicate that legal compliance is present in the first, 
“elementary”, stage. For these reasons, it seems that voluntary disclosure, rather than 
mandatory one, is the best expression for companies’ CSR. 
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2.2. Determinants of non-financial disclosure 
Literature identifies several dimensions that prompts the issuance of a voluntary sustainability 
report. Such dimensions can be generally classified into external and internal: in their study of 
the evolution of third-party assurance of sustainability reports, Perego & Kolk (2012, p.185) 
suggest that “a combination of (external) institutional pressures and (internal) set of resources 
and capabilities provides most fruitful insights in explaining variation of firm’ adoption and 
integration of standardized management tools”, such as non-financial reporting frameworks 
and assurance. Their point of view is convenient with Oliver’s (1991) one, according to which 
organizations strategic response, in this case the issuance of a non-financial report, are crafted 
when confronted with institutional pressures, and they are a function of internal culture, 
norms and values. Research provides more insights in terms of external dimension, rather 
than internal one.  In his early contribution, Ullman (1985) already indicated firm size, 
industry and company visibility, external pressures and executive values as determinants of 
social disclosure. Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & Vasvari (2007) indicate stakeholders’ 
pressures, mandatory requirements, industrial peers’ strategies, media coverage, image and 
reputation. On the internal side of the determinants, much effort has been spent linking 
corporate social disclosure and corporate governance (Kolk & Pinske, 2010). Michelon & 
Parbonetti (2010) studied board composition of 57 Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
companies, showing the effect of indipendent directors and “community influentials”, as well 
of CEO duality, on disclosure. Research regarding internal resources and capabilities, 
individual and organizational values and culture is currently an almost unexplored territory. 
Visibly, also a firm’s sustainable performance determines the issuance of a non-financial 
report. Researches on this topic can be divided into two main opposite stands: those referring 
to the voluntary disclosure theory (Dye, 1985; Verrecchia, 1983) and those referring to socio-
political theories (Skinner, 1994; Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995). The first theory, in line with 
signaling theory (Spence, 1973), posits that better performers have a proactive attitude 
towards stakeholders, thus they signal their improved results through higher levels of 
disclosure of verifiable and measurable data. Differently, inferior performers choose to 
disclose less or to be “silent”. The latter theory claims that firms have a defensive approach 
towards disclosure: companies with poor sustainability results use reports in order to explain 
or justify their shortcomings, aiming to defend their legitimacy to operate. 
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Recent studies are trying to overcome this dichotomy, looking for an integrative interpretation 
of the two stances. In particular, Cho, Patten, & Roberts (2006) suggest that reports quality is 
a major issue in studying the relationship with environmental performance. “Companies with 
superior environmental performance […] seek to reveal their performance type, something 
not directly observable to investors and other stakeholders, through direct voluntary 
disclosures that cannot be easily mimicked by poor performers” (the so called “hard 
disclosure”) (Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & Vasvari, p.6, 2007). Consequently, these last firms 
make unverifiable and unmeasurable (the so called “soft disclosure”) claims to show their 
commitment to sustainability, in order to defend their legitimacy.  
Concluding, empirical evidence shows that both poor and high performers disclose. The main 
difference lies in the quality, hard or soft, of their non-financial reports. 
 
2.3. Disclosure and Economic Performance 
In most cases, the decision to issue a non-financial report is motivated through economic 
thinking: social and environmental reporting deliver benefits to a range of stakeholders while 
serving to enhance shareholder value (Spence & Gray, 2007). However, also in this case 
evidence provided by literature is mixed. In his early literature review regarding the 
relationship between social and environmental disclosure and economic performance, Ullman 
(1985, p.551) concludes that “given the ambiguous results, no clear tendency can be 
discerned”. Burnett, Skousen, & Wright (2011) show that the issuance of a non-financial 
report has a positive effect on firms’ market value, especially in the long term. Xu, Zeng, & 
Tam (2011, p.227) observe stock market’s reaction to disclosure of environmental violations 
for Chinese listed companies, finding that “the average reduction in market value is estimated 
to be much lower than the estimated changes in market value for similar events in other 
countries”. Using a dataset provided by the Thailand Institute of Directors’ Corporate 
Governance Benchmarking Survey, Connelly and Limpaphayom (2004) find a significant 
positive and non-linear relationship between environmental reporting and market valuation, 
while no link is evidenced with accounting performance. Stanwick and Stanwick (2000, 
p.155) conduct an examination of 469 US firms’ environmental disclosures, their result shows 
that “firms classified as high financial performers have higher incidences of environmental 
policies and/or descriptions of environmental commitment than firms classified as low 
performers”. 
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Theories in strategy provide the correct reading of the relationship between corporate social 
disclosures and economic performance: “the missing element [in the relationship] is strategy” 
(Ullman, 1985, p. 552; Perego & Kolk, 2012). As indicated by Bowman & Haire (1975), 
managers are called to decide on how to allocate company resources optimally between 
various effectiveness dimensions for successfully coping with the task environment. 
Addressing to the stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), which is one of the most applied 
theoretical framework in the field of CSR (Searcy, 2012), the task environment is populated 
by individuals and groups, including employees, shareholders, customers, the wider 
community, to whom companies have obligations. According to this view, corporate social 
disclosure is able to generate and enhance organizational legitimacy, demonstrating that a 
firm shares the same value system of the wider community (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2010), 
trust and reputation (Lamberti & Lettieri, 2009), moving from a “trust me” approach to a “tell 
me” one (Perrini, 2005), shareholder value creation alignment with social value creation 
(Chatterji & Levine, 2006), reliability, transparency and brand positioning (Perrini, Russo, 
Tencati, & Vurro, 2011). In summary, “the disclosure of financial, social and environmental 
information is part of the dialogue between a company and its stakeholders and it provides 
information on a company’s activities that legitimize its behavior, educate and inform, and 
change perceptions and expectations” (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2010, p. 478). If there are still 
uncertainties regarding corporate social disclosure business case, researchers definitely agree 
on the existence of a stakeholder case. 
Corporate social disclosure can be a source of value for firms also as a form of sustainability 
performance measurement system (SPMS). A SPMS is a set of performance measures that 
provides a company with useful information that helps manage, control, plan and perform 
activities undertaken by the company (Tangen, 2005). In such view, “what gets measured, 
gets managed”: corporate social disclosure can help managers taking long-term decisions, and 
increase shareholders long-term value, on condition that disclosure is endowed with 
comparability, reliability and validity of data (Chatterji & Levine, 2006). Moreover, presence 
of such “hard” disclosure signals to shareholders and stakeholders that managerial decisions 
are taken also considering non-financial data: “reporting-based analyses represent the right 
way towards an overall comprehension of what practitioners consider efficient and 
appropriate socially responsible behavior” (Perrini, 2005). 
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2.4. Hypotheses development 
Considering the stakeholder case of corporate social disclosure, it seems that the issuance of a 
social and environmental report can create different sources of value for the stakeholders and 
as a result of these, eventually improve firms ‘economic performance, following the value 
creation mechanism described by Perrini, Russo, Tencati, & Vurro (2011). Thus, I propose 
the first hypothesis to be tested: 
Hypothesis 1: The issuance of a sustainability report has a positive impact 
on firms’ market value 
“Formulating social responsibility programs as well as disclosing their existence can be 
viewed as part of the strategic arsenal of dealing with one particular segment of a firm’s 
stakeholders” (Ullman, 1985, p. 552). Managers can decide the amount of information 
provided in their non-financial report, accordingly to the definition they give to their 
company’s accountability boundaries (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2010). The stakeholder 
approach suggests that the more information is disclosed, the more companies would enjoy 
increase of those intangible resources that eventually affect the overall economic 
performance. Higher levels of disclosure represent a stronger attitude towards sustainability, 
as Dawkins and Fraas (2010, p.385-386) advance: “it may be that companies that have a 
adopted a full disclosure have done so because they fundamentally believe that their strengths 
outweigh their weaknesses and are committed to environmental disclosure as a matter of 
value”. 
On the other hand, corporate social disclosure has its costs. In addition to the very direct costs 
of reporting activity, linked to report designing and drafting, employees training, data 
acquiring, assurance granting and publication, there are other sources of costs to be 
considered. First, the costs related to the object of analysis, which is corporate sustainability 
performance. It is a complex domain, endowed with pluralistic goals, ambiguity, uncertainty, 
and context dominance (Searcy, 2009). It requires multidisciplinary competencies, as well as 
the inclusion of stakeholders’ panels in its processes, creating the opposition of different 
mindsets (O'Dwyer, 2011). As a result, “in many corporations, people are simply not 
equipped to effectively pursue a commitment toward corporate sustainability” (Searcy, 2012, 
p. 240), and a lack of these capabilities can represent a serious impediment for the diffusion of 
sustainability practices, like non-financial reporting (Perego & Kolk, 2012). Secondly, other 
costs are associated to managing excessive diversification, as managers and directors have to 
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shift from a single goal perspective to a triple or even multiple bottom line (Jensen, 2001). 
Finally, because of the proliferation of non-financial reporting standards, managers face too 
many frameworks to address. They often choose the one that requires less time and resources, 
although “the metrics that are the easiest to report are not always the most informative” 
(Chatterji & Levine, 2006, p. 5). Furthermore, proliferation of measures benefits poor 
performers, who can design their own metrics in order to “greenwash” their performance, 
deceiving stakeholders, and confusing consumers and socially responsible investors. As a 
result, they reduce the weight of non-financial measures in their decisions (Chatterji & 
Levine, 2006). 
Given these considerations, I propose the following second hypothesis, testing whether the 
additional benefits generated by higher amounts of disclosure overcome its additional costs: 
Hypothesis 2: the issuance of a sustainability report with a higher amount 
of disclosure determines a higher positive effect on firms’ market value 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Data and Sample 
As explained by Brown, de Jong, & Levy, (2009), in recent years large multinational 
enterprises have dominated sustainability reporting. A number of reason support the size-
disclosure relationship. Firstly, larger firms are more political visible and often become the 
“focal point” of broader wars against social and environmental injustices (Chatterji & Levine, 
2006). Thus, big companies try to reduce this pressure by various measures, like non-financial 
reporting (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Secondly, bigger firms may enjoy economies of scale 
and bear lower information production costs (Foster, 1986), or lower costs of competitive 
disadvantage resulting from disclosing corporate information (Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995). 
Accordingly, I have selected the companies listed in the Fortune Global 500 2012 ranking as 
the sampling frame. I have collected financial data for a period of analysis of two years (2010, 
2011). After having excluded outliers, firms missing financial data and companies belonging 
to less polluting industries, the final sample results in a balanced panel consisting of 256 
observations, 128 per year. The choice of the “worst offenders” industries is because these 
may experience greater media attention and more pressures from NGOs, consumers, and 
governmental authorities (Bansel, 2005).  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the final sample. It includes companies operating in 
5 industries (agriculture, chemicals/heavy industry, light industry, energy, 
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shipping/transport/distribution), coming from 26 different countries representing 6 world 
areas (North America, South America, Europe, Asia, Far East, Oceania). 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics for the final sample, 2012 data 
Industry 
No. of 
Firms 
Avg. 
Profits ($ 
B.) 
St. Dev. 
Profits ($ 
B.) 
Avg. 
Assets ($ 
B.) 
St. Dev.  
Assets ($ 
B.) 
Avg. Net 
Revenues (B. 
$) 
St. Dev. Net 
Revenues (B. 
$) 
Agriculture 8 2,30 1,33 37,04 10,19 42,80 20,87 
Chemicals/ 
heavy 
industry 
48 5,41 4,42 81,20 38,17 59,64 37,17 
Energy 58 7,00 8,06 113,90 93,65 109,38 110,19 
Light industry 110 2,35 3,10 77,69 117,09 56,69 46,75 
Shipping/ 
transport/ 
distribution 
32 1,80 1,72 55,89 59,31 56,08 30,06 
 
 
3.2. Operationalization of Disclosure 
In this paper, I propose the framework developed by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) G3 
and G3.1 Guidelines (Global Reporting Initiative, 2011a) as the standard for non-financial 
reporting. There are several reasons that justify this choice. First, though there is not a 
commonly accepted definition of corporate reporting in the published literature (Schaltegger 
& Burritt, 2009; Roca & Searcy, 2011; Aktas, Kayalidere, & Kargin, 2013), practitioners and 
scholars agree on the fact that GRI is the most well-known and widely applied guideline for 
sustainability reporting (Aktas, Kayalidere, & Kargin, 2013; Chatterji & Levine, 2006; 
Searcy, 2012). In particular, Brown, de Jong, & Levy, (2009) argue that GRI exhibits several 
features of an established institution, such as broad uptake and legitimacy. GRI framework 
boasts a multiple stakeholder approach, as the Guidelines include them in the report design 
and fulfillment process. GRI reports include environmental, economic and social indicators, 
accordingly with the Triple Bottom Line methodology. GRI has developed sector 
PAGE 11| Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management | 2015, VOL. 2, NO. 2 
 
supplements in order to improve its framework ability to disclose information regarding 
specific industries, including automotive, electric utilities, mining and metals, oil and gas, 
telecommunications (Global Reporting Initiative, 2011a). Sustainability reports assurors also 
employ GRI guidelines to standardize assuring process (Perego & Kolk, 2012). In their 
analysis of indicators disclosed in corporate sustainability reports, Roca and Searcy (2012) 
investigated 94 non-financial reports, finding that 45 of them (47,9%) use the GRI G3 
Guidelines, while 31 include indicators explicitly identified as GRI indicators. Such 
increasing diffusion represents a great opportunity to reduce costs of reporting through 
standardization (Chatterji & Levine, 2006), in particular considering the recent effort to 
produce a digital disclosure of sustainability information with the XBRL machine-readable 
format (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013b). Nonetheless, there are some critics of the GRI 
framework. Goel (2005), Smith & Lenssen (2009) claim that GRI indicators are too many and 
too general to be a management tool. Moneva, Archel, & Correa (2006) strongly criticize 
methodology behind the G2 version of the Guidelines, specifying that performance indicators 
are not balanced among the three sustainability dimensions, and evidencing  that companies 
use the Guidelines to legitimize their action rather than embracing the values and principles of 
sustainability. 
According to GRI G3.1 Guidelines (Global Reporting Initiative, 2011a), each report consists  
of three sections: Profile Disclosures, Disclosures on Management Approach (DMA), 
Performance Indicators & Sector Supplement Performance Indicators. The first set includes 
information about strategy and analysis, organization profile, report parameters, governance, 
commitment and engagement. The DMA regards the management attitude towards each topic 
covered by the report (economic, environmental, social issues). The last section discloses 
qualitative and quantitative data regarding economic and environmental performance, results 
in term of labor practices and decent work, human rights, society and product responsibility. 
A GRI report is not mandatory in all its sections, due to its voluntary nature. For this reason, 
each reporting organization should declare the grade to which it has applied the framework 
specified in the Guidelines. The “Applications Levels” (AL) system assesses the grade of 
disclosure, giving a score that goes from C (minimum disclosure) to A (full disclosure). 
Report makers self-declare their Application Level, and, in addition, they can have their self-
declaration externally assured by a third party (receiving a “+” to their AL) and/or request the 
GRI to check the self-declaration (Global Reporting Initiative, 2011b). Table 2 presents 
details about the AL system. Traditional metrics regarding the amount of disclosure in non-
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financial reports are based on content analysis methodologies, e.g. percent of prose in annual 
reports, number of pages/sentences regarding non-financial issues.  Such methodology has the 
major issue of producing high variability in the results depending from the analysis level of 
refinement (Ullman, 1985). The AL system is a less arbitrary metric; furthermore, it is 
coherent within the GRI Guidelines, as the same author of the framework has designed it. 
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Table 2:  Report Application Level system (GRI 2011b) 
Profile Disclosure 
Report on: 
1.1 
2.1-2.10 
3.1-3.8, 3.10- 3.12 
4.1-4.4, 4.14-4.15 
Report on all criteria listed 
for level C, plus: 
1.2 
3.9-3.13 
4.5-4.13,4.16-4.17 
Same as requirement for 
Level B 
Disclosure on 
Management Approach 
Not required 
Management approach 
disclosure for each 
indicator category 
Management approach 
disclosure for each 
indicator category 
Performance Indicators & 
Sector Supplements 
Performance Indicators 
Report fully on a 
minimum of any 10 
performance indicators, 
including at least one from 
each of: social, economic, 
and environment. 
Report fully on a 
minimum of any 20 
performance indicators, 
including at least one from 
each of: economic, 
environment, human 
rights, labor, society, 
product responsibility 
Respond on each core and 
Sector Supplement 
indicator with due regard 
to the materiality principle 
by either: A) reporting on 
the indicator or B) 
explaining the reason for 
its omission  
Report Application Level C B A 
 
Data regarding reports’ Application Level is available in the GRI Sustainability Disclosure 
Database website (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013b). In order to strengthen the validity of 
the Application Level, I have excluded self-declared reports, as well as non-GRI reports. 
Indeed, assured reports respond to the demand for reliable and credible information, 
guaranteeing that the report truly represents a company’s effort and achievements 
(KPMG/UvA, 2008). However, the so-called “rational myth” often flaws the assurance 
process: “report readers would often have great uncertainty in understanding how the 
assurance provider undertook the engagement, what they reviewed and what was the meaning 
of conclusion” (Deegan, Cooper, & Shelly, 2006, p. 368).  Table 3 presents GRI reporting 
information for the sample. 
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Table 3:  GRI Application Level for the sample. Data 2010-2011 
GRI Application 
Level 
No. of Firms 
A 4 
A+ 42 
B 5 
B+ 12 
C+ 1 
Undeclared 1 
 
3.3. Econometric Model 
Ohlson, (1995) provides a model for examining the variation of market value, or price, of the 
firm at date t when a vector of other value-relevant information changes. On the hypothesis of 
efficient markets, share price changes would reflect also social disclosures, given their 
informational value (Ullman, 1985). Burnett, Skousen, & Wright (2011) use such model in 
their analysis of eco-effective management, linking firm value and corporate sustainability. In 
particular, they add cash flow from operations, leverage grade, and ROA to the original 
model, since relevant literature (Schaltegger, Burritt, & R., 2000; Cormier, Gordon, & 
Magnan, 2004) indicates that such elements enhance model’s robustness and explanatory 
power. 
As seen before, GRI Application Level is an ordinal, non-metric, scale. Its values are rank-
ordered, but are not equidistant one from the other. For this reason, statistical techniques such 
as correlation, regression, and analysis of variance are not suitable. I converted the level of 
disclosure into two dichotomous variables, GRI1 and GRI2, following the criteria reported in 
Table 3, to overcome this issue. 
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Table 4:  Conversion of GRI Application Level in two dichotomous variables 
GRI1 No issuance of a GRI report Issuance of a GRI report 
GRI2 
Publication of a GRI report with an  
application level score lower than A 
Publication of a GRI report with an 
A application level score  
VALUE 0 1 
 
Thus, the equation of the model is: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎3𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎4𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎5𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎6𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖      (1) 
Where: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖= market capitalization of firm i at date t 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  = total shareholder equity 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = return on activities 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = cash flow from operations 
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = long-term debt/equity 
With the aim of mitigating heteroscedasticity and controlling for size, net revenues scale 
MKV, TSE and CFO. Moreover, industry, year and geographical dummies are included in the 
analysis to control their effects. To test the validity of the model beyond endogeneity issues, I 
run the model with MKV values of the subsequent years as dependent variable.  
 
 
4. RESULTS 
I test the hypotheses running a weighted least square (WLS) regression. There are several 
justifications for using such kind of regression. First, the Breusch-Pagan test shows that a 
pooled OLS model is inadequate, in favor of the random effect alternative (p-value < 0, 
000001). The fixed-effects model is unfit because it excludes the predictors from the analysis. 
Following a technique proposed by Mundlak (1978), means of independent variables are 
included in the regression to relax the assumption in the random-effects estimator that the 
observed variables are uncorrelated with the unobserved variables. The Hausman test verifies 
that the assumptions underlying the random effects regression are satisfied. Its results show 
that the generalized least squares (GLS) estimates are consistent (p-value = 0,376503). 
Although I scale MKV, TSE, and CFO by net revenues, heteroscedasticity is still present, as 
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confirmed by Wald test (p-value = 0). For this reason, I use a WLS regression with weights 
based on per-unit error variances. Table 5 provides the results. 
 
Table 5:  WLS, using 256 observations, included 128 cross-sectional units. Weights based on per-unit error 
variances. 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
Const -0.766405 0.202204 -3.7903 0.00019 *** 
Equity 0.219166 0.365871 0.5990 0.54973  
Cash Flow 1.13423 0.587052 1.9321 0.05455 * 
ROA -2.77247 0.702761 -3.9451 0.00011 *** 
Leverage 0.00329097 0.0447368 0.0736 0.94142  
GRI1 0.216974 0.0426563 5.0866 <0.00001 *** 
GRI2 -0.371774 0.0507369 -7.3275 <0.00001 *** 
Mean Equity -0.382274 0.386899 -0.9880 0.32415  
Mean Cash Flow 6.48796 0.70687 9.1784 <0.00001 *** 
Mean Leverage -0.0592301 0.0358038 -1.6543 0.09940 * 
Mean ROA 2.77322 0.726789 3.8157 0.00017 *** 
Industry control Yes 
Geo control Yes 
Year control Yes 
   
  *** indicate significance at p ≤ 0,01  
  ** indicate significance at p ≤ 0,05 
  * indicate significance at p ≤ 0,1 
 
The variables of interest, GRI1 and GRI2 are both significant at 0,01 level. GRI1 effect is 
positive, confirming hypothesis 1. Therefore, the issuance of a GRI report determines a 
significant positive effect on market capitalization. Unexpectedly, GRI2 has a negative 
coefficient, rejecting the proposition of hypothesis 2. A full disclosure stance is not valued by 
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the market, at least in the industries considered in the sample. The analysis includes control 
effects of industry, world area and year of investigation. For what concerns measures of fit, R-
squared (0,923) and adjusted R-squared (0,917) show that the model explains more than two-
thirds of the variance of the dependent variable. 
 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The dialogue between organizations and stakeholders is a key element in the definition of 
companies’ social and environmental responsibility and business success. Firms face a 
growing pressure to include voluntarily non-financial elements in their strategies, going 
beyond legal requirements. Companies have a plenty of ways to communicate such 
information to stakeholders. Relevant research (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2010) points out that 
sustainability reports are on average the preferred mean to disclose non-financial data. Even 
though  the relationship between sustainability disclosures and sustainable performance is still 
unclear (Ullman, 1985; Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & Vasvari, 2007), because of 
methodological and measurement weaknesses, corporate social disclosure represents the most 
direct expression of firms’ CSR and reporting-based analyses are the correct way towards the 
comprehension of what can be considered a socially responsible behaviour (Perrini, 2005). A 
strategic issue remains open: given the voluntary nature of CSR reporting, to which extent 
should managers go beyond law requirements meeting stakeholders’ demands? 
The aim of this article is to investigate whether and to what extent stakeholders value 
companies’ voluntary efforts meeting their demand for non-financial performance 
information. Firstly, I test if the issuance of a sustainability report determines an increase of 
firms’ market value. Evidence provided by literature offers mixed results, depicting no clear 
tendency, because of both conceptual and methodological shortcomings. (Ullman, 1985). In 
particular, the strategic perspective is the key missing element needed to understand this 
relationship (Ullman, 1985; Perego & Kolk, 2012). Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) 
propose an appropriate framework to overcome the inconclusiveness of results. According to 
it, corporate social disclosure can increase organizational legitimacy, transparency, reliability, 
trust and reputation, social and shareholder value creation alignment, as well as signaling that 
managers include non-financial indicators in their decision-making processes. These 
intangible benefits are the main drivers of firm ability to advantage from CSR and its 
reporting (Perrini, Russo, Tencati, & Vurro, 2011), establishing  the existence of a stakeholder 
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case that preempts the uncertain business case of corporate social disclosure. Secondly, I 
verify if a higher amount of disclosure in sustainability reporting leads to a higher reward in 
terms of firm market value, providing an innovative point of view in the disclosure-economic 
performance relationship studies. Indeed, the decision to report social and environmental 
issues is almost always justified through economic reasoning: benefits have to overcome costs 
(Spence & Gray, 2007). Reporting greater amount of information generates additional costs, 
basically because “the measurements that are easiest to report are not always the most 
informative” (Chatterji & Levine, 2006, p. 5). 
I operationalize corporate social disclosure with the issuance of a non-financial report shaped 
following the GRI G3.1 Guidelines in order to test the two hypotheses. The GRI Guidelines 
are the most well-known and widely applied framework for sustainability reporting (Roca & 
Searcy, 2011) and the Global Reporting Initiative itself is today an established insitution, 
endowed with broad uptake and legitimacy (Brown, de Jong, & Levy, 2009).  
The 2-years longitudinal analysis of the Fortune Global 500 companies provides interesting 
results. I test the relationship between market capitalization and level of disclosure in GRI 
reporting through Ohlson’s (1995) model, controlling for industry, geographical and year 
effects. Results confirm the first hypothesis, showing that the issuance of a GRI G3.1 report 
determines a positive effect in terms of market value. This outcome confirms the existence of 
the stakeholder case for corporate social disclosure: companies publishing a GRI report show 
their commitment towards sustainability, signaling that their management includes it in the 
strategy-making process, strengthening a set of intangibles resources (trust, transparency, 
reputation) that eventually drives the economic return. The analysis leaves out of 
consideration social and environmental performance, thus stakeholders recognize this 
remuneration only to the disclosure of non-financial information. Dawkins and Fraas (2010) 
and Fombrun, Gardberg, & Barnet (2000) provide a possible explanation for this, grounded in 
the strategic approach towards reporting: disclosure can be a “safety net” for poor performers, 
saving their legitimacy to operate, or an “opportunity platform” for good performers, 
signaling their superior ability to achieve triple bottom line results. Nevertheless, the 
remuneration of disclosure has its limits, as the rejection of the second hypothesis 
demonstrates. In fact, the issuance of a GRI report with a full disclosure stance has a strongly 
significant negative effect on market value. This outcome carries important implications for 
both research and management. First, there is a specific amount of disclosure that 
stakeholders perceive to be optimum. Beyond this quantity, no benefits seems to be delivered 
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to stakeholders, who in turn consider this additional information unusable and costly. Second, 
“Friedman-type investors could view a firm’s social performance as detrimental or excessive 
to economic performance – the only legitimate activity in their opinion” (Ullman, 1985, p. 
546). A full disclosure stance can be considered as a signal of an excessive sensitivity towards 
social and environmental issues, leading managers to a disproportionate strategy-making 
process, where the multiple goals of the triple bottom line are not balanced. Third, the 
proliferation of information produces a flooding of data that confounds stakeholders and they 
end up ignoring it and considering it useless.  This is because “the introduction of each 
additional performance metric dilutes the importance of all that preceded it” (Chatterji & 
Levine, 2006, p. 2). This result opens a debate over the quality of disclosure, conceived as its 
capacity to satisfy stakeholders’ informative needs. The quantity of disclosure alone is not 
sufficient to achieve this result, even because its relationship with actual environmental and 
social performance is still unclear. 
Although this research provides an interesting contribution to corporate social disclosure 
research, it also has some limitations that open avenues for future studies. In particular, the 
“worst offenders” industries choice limits the generalization of the results. It is likely that less 
polluting industries face different stakeholders’ pressures and reactions towards disclosure. 
Moreover, the sample cannot overcome a common limitation of sustainability empirical 
analysis, which is the size bias: the Fortune Global 500 are the biggest companies in the 
world, thus generalization of results is limited to this kind of businesses. Further research 
could test sustainable performance, level of disclosure and economic performance at the same 
time. Lastly, it would be of interest to understand the components and indicators of disclosure 
quality, as well as to juxtapose the effects on firm performance of hard disclosure against soft 
disclosure. 
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